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CHARGE MOVEMENT AND THEORIES OF

PROSECUTORS
RONALD F. WRIGHT*
RODNEY L. ENGEN**
I. INTRODUCTION

Any quick review of court statistics-or a single afternoon spent in
the hallways of a criminal courthouse-will confirm that criminal
charges move. The more serious charges filed at the start of the case
often move down to less serious charges that form the basis for a guilty
plea and conviction. Concurrent charges of less serious crimes are often
dismissed outright as part of a plea agreement. Of these two bargaining
options, the movement of the primary charge to a less serious one
usually has greater consequences, since it is the primary charge that
typically carries the most weight in determining the sentence. The
reduction of felony charges to misdemeanors is especially consequential
because it generally reduces the punishment and has much less impact
on an offender's criminal history. For these reasons, the movement
from felony to misdemeanor charges has important ramifications for
convicted offenders not only in the immediate case, but far into the
future.
Although charge movement is routine and conceptually important to
an understanding of plea bargaining, the socio-legal literature has not
created a very rich account of charge movement, either in empirical or
theoretical terms. Scholars note in general that charge movement
happens, but they do not document how often, or the size of those
movements. We know little about when prosecutors shift the charges
instead of engaging in other forms of bargaining, and we know little
about what limits the movement of charges. Further, while scholars
have debated at great length whether plea bargaining in general is good
or bad or inevitable, we have not sorted out whether charge
* Ronald F. Wright, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Wake
Forest University.
** Rodney L. Engen, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
North Carolina State University.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[91:9

bargaining-as opposed to other forms of bargaining-is normatively
desirable with respect to its effects on sentencing, particularly when
charge bargains operate within highly structured sentencing guideline
laws.
In our recent work on charge movement based on data from North
Carolina, we tried to answer some of these empirical questions in a
preliminary way, describing patterns of charge reductions between
indictment and conviction for different types of crimes, and describing
the effects of these reductions on the severity of sentences imposed.1
After noting that charges move at different rates for different crimes, we
tried to explain the differences among crimes by looking to the structure
of the substantive criminal law. In particular, our account relied on the
concept of "depth" in a criminal code. The depth of a criminal code
measures the number of plausible criminal charges that are available to
the prosecution and defense as they negotiate a guilty plea based on a
summary set of facts. Groups of crimes that offer deeper options to the
negotiators (such as the many versions of assault) appear to produce
more frequent charge movement. Conversely, crimes that present more
shallow options (such as the relatively few statutory sections related to
kidnapping) appear to produce fewer reductions in the original charges.
Thus, the structure of the code has predictable effects on plea
negotiations and-particularly in a state with determinate sentencing
laws-on the sentencing outcomes. Put another way, criminal codes
matter, even in a world of bargained justice.
In Part II of this Essay, we summarize our earlier findings about
depth in criminal codes and then expand our account on the empirical
side to address the dividing line between felonies and misdemeanors.
For a variety of reasons, plea negotiators treat the felony-misdemeanor
line as a major hurdle to cross. We explore here the effects of depth of
felony charging options on the likelihood that cases move from felonies
to misdemeanors. In particular, the deeper the felony options available,
the less likely prosecutors are to agree to a misdemeanor outcome.
Based on these patterns of charge movement, it appears that while
prosecutors frequently reduce the seriousness of charges, they treat
misdemeanors as a least-preferred option, perhaps even as a last resort.
In Part III, we shift our focus to the theoretical and normative
questions connected to charge movement. Assuming that the structure
of the criminal code does affect the frequency and size of charge
1. Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a
Criminal Code on Charging,Sentencing, and ProsecutorPower, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935 (2006).
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movements, what does this mean for our accounts of criminal
prosecutors and criminal codes? What does it say about prosecutors'
motivations for reducing charges? Should we favor changes to criminal
codes that make charge movement easier? Would different theories of
prosecution lead to different normative implications about charge
movement and the best structure for a criminal code?
Any evaluation of legal tools, such as the structure of a legal code,
will depend on our expectations about the users of those tools-here,
the prosecutors. The meaning and desirability of charge movement will
differ for those who employ different theories of decision making by
prosecutors. In particular, we distinguish here between the "who" and
"what" dimensions in theories of prosecutors' decision making. We also
distinguish between theories that focus on the priorities of individual
line prosecutors versus those that view the prosecutor in a broader
organizational context. For instance, some accounts of prosecution
emphasize the power relationships among the people in the prosecutor's
office and the relationships between prosecutors and other actors in
criminal justice. These theories, in one sense, ask "Who decides on
criminal prosecutions?" For these "who" theories, charge movement is
generally negative because it obscures accountability, making it difficult
to appreciate which of the actors is making the truly relevant choices.
Theoretical accounts of the prosecutor's work also build on critical
assumptions about the objectives of individual prosecutors. Some of
those objectives might be concerned first and foremost with the public
interest (e.g., ensuring public safety or seeking fair and just outcomes).
Other objectives might be more self-interested (e.g., maintaining a high
conviction rate while managing a large caseload). Still others may be
driven by organizational needs (e.g., conserving scarce resources). All
of these accounts, however, try to answer a common question: "What
does the prosecutor want to accomplish and what considerations affect
how the prosecutor pursues those goals?"
For these theories of prosecution, charge movement is neither
positive nor negative in itself. One's reaction to charge movement turns
on an underlying evaluation of what the prosecutor hopes to accomplish
and how well the prosecutor uses his or her considerable discretion. If
one assumes the prosecutor is likely to maximize public goods, then
charge movements can help the prosecutor do more of a good thing. At
the other extreme, if prosecutorial discretion is seen as arbitrary or
biased against particular groups, then excessive charge movement may
be seen as a source of injustice. An empirical evaluation of charge
movement, then, helps clarify our assumptions about prosecutors and
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their work and can inform discussions about the normative desirability
of criminal codes.
One might view our work on charge movement-both the empirical
and theoretical components-as a corrective to overly broad statements
about plea bargaining that happens "outside the shadow" of the criminal
law and the criminal trial.2 While it is true that guilty pleas do not
closely resemble the results that might flow from application of the
criminal laws at trial, it is still demonstrably true that the criminal code
matters. The code restricts the bargaining options of the parties and
makes some outcomes more difficult, regardless of the desires of the
negotiating parties, while facilitating other outcomes.
II. CRIMINAL CODES MATTER

The sentencing laws in North Carolina make for an especially
interesting case study for our purposes, in light of its determinate
"structured sentencing" laws. Charge movement is especially worth
measuring in a system with determinate sentencing laws because charge
movement so clearly shifts the sentence. Legal scholars have argued, at
least since the 1970s, that such laws will be circumvented through charge
bargaining, undermining the goals sought by reformers. As Albert
Alschuler famously argued:
[F]ixed and presumptive sentencing schemes . . . are
unlikely to achieve their objectives so long as they leave
the prosecutor's power ... unchecked. Indeed, this sort
of reform is likely to produce its antithesis-a system
every bit as lawless as the current sentencing regime, in
which discretion is concentrated in an inappropriate
agency, and in which the benefits of this discretion are
made available only to defendants who sacrifice their
constitutional rights.'
While laws like North Carolina's structured sentencing guidelines
may enhance prosecutorial discretion over sentencing, the reality of

2. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea BargainingOutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2464, 2465 (2004); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingand CriminalLaw's Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2548-49 (2004); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 536-37 (2001).
3. Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of
Recent Proposalsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 550-51
(1978).
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criminal justice nearly thirty years later probably is not as bleak as
Alschuler predicted it would be. Indeed, some evidence-limited
though it is-suggests that prosecutors did not radically change their
behavior in the wake of sentencing guidelines. While charge bargaining
may mitigate the effects of sentencing laws in some instances, those laws
have not been wholly circumvented either.4 Our research contributes to
this debate. We argue that, as with judicial discretion at the sentencing
stage, prosecutorial discretion to control sentencing through charge
manipulation is also structured by criminal codes and sentencing laws,
though not necessarily in ways that were anticipated or intended by
legal reformers who enacted these laws.
The 1994 Structured Sentencing Act ("SSA") in North Carolina
created a familiar sentencing guideline grid, with a horizontal axis to
measure the extent of the offender's prior criminal record and a vertical
axis to measure the seriousness of the crime-for felonies, Classes A
through I.5 Each combination of crime "class" and prior record "level"
occupies its own cell in the grid. The cell contains information for the
sentencing judge about the available sentence dispositions: active prison
terms, intermediate sanctions, or community sanctions. All of the grid
cells at Class D and higher allow only for active prison terms, while
some cells in the lower portions of the grid allow only for community or
intermediate punishments. Cells that are situated on the border
between these parts of the grid give the judge a choice between two
different dispositions. Each cell in the grid also specifies the durations
of the prison terms the judge could select, including a presumptive

4. See Wright & Engen, supra note 1, at 1943-44 & nn.28-32 (citing Terance D. Miethe
& Charles A. Moore, Socioeconomic Disparities Under Determinate Sentencing Systems: A
Comparison of Preguideline and Postguideline Practicesin Minnesota, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 337,
342 (1985); Terance D. Miethe, Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices Under Determinate
Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 155, 161 (1987) (showing that charging and plea bargaining practices changed
little following the introduction of sentencing guidelines in Minnesota and that reductions in
the primary charge were infrequent)), for a review of empirical evidence on the displacement
of discretion under determinate and mandatory sentencing laws. See also Rodney L. Engen,
Have Sentencing Reforms Displaced Discretion over Sentencingfrom Judges to Prosecutors?,
in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (John L. Worral & M. Elaine
Nugent-Borakove eds.) (forthcoming); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea
Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its
Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period,91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1284, 1290-91 (1997) (arguing that
federal prosecutors circumvent sentencing guidelines in twenty to thirty-five percent of

cases).
5. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17(c) (2005)
sentencing grid).

(setting out the North Carolina
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range, a lower mitigated range, and a higher aggravated range.6 A
sentencing judge who moves out of the presumptive range must find a
legally sufficient aggravating or mitigating fact to justify a departure
from the normal range!
Because the seriousness of the charge is one of the two primary
inputs into the sentencing calculation under this system, the decision by
a prosecutor to reduce the charges that were originally filed can have a
measurable effect on the sentence. And before the prosecutor ever
makes these crucial choices about charge movement, the structure of the
criminal code shapes the cptions available for the prosecutor to
consider.
A. Depth in Criminal Codes
Charge movement does not create identical effects for different
types of crimes.
For instance, assault crimes resulted in more
discounting of charges than kidnapping crimes. As Table 1 indicates,
88% of the assaults originally charged as Class C felonies moved to
some less serious version of assault; the same was true for 75% of the
original Class E assaults and 67% of the Class F assaults.

6. For a current version of the grids, see North Carolina Court System,
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Punishment.asp (last visited Nov. 4,
2007).
7. See § 15A-1340.16 (providing definitions and examples of aggravating and mitigating
factors).

CHARGE MOVEMENT

2007]

Table 1
Offense Class of Conviction by Class of Most Serious
Charged Offense: Assault8
Charged Offense
Class C
Class E

Class F

Total

(N = 675)

(N = 928)

(N = 146)

(N = 1,749)

AWDW
IKSI

AWDW
IK or SI

ASSAULT
SI

Conviction
Offense Class
Felony
C

Most Common
Offense

D

Vol.
Manslaughter,
Robbery w/DW

28(4%)

E

AWDW IK or
SI

265 (39%)

V34 (25%)

4 (3%)

503 (29%)

F

Assault SI

66 (10%)

65 (7%)

43 (30%)

174(10%)

G

Robbery,
Assault,
Weapon
Possession

17(2%)

16(2%)

3(2%)

36(2%)

H

Other Assault,
B&E, Larceny,
Drug Possession
Total Felony

14 (2%)

34(4%)

6 (4%)

54 (3%)

479 (71%)

367 (40%)

58(40%)

904 (52%)

Assault SI (m),

161 (24%)

465 (50%)

69 (47%)

695 (40%)

35 (5%)
196 (29%)

96 (10%)
561 (60%)

19 (13%)
88 (60%)

149 (8%)
845 (48%)

Misdemeanor
Al

AWDW IKSI

0(12%)

2 (<1%)

0

82(5%)

1 (<1%)

0

29 (2%)

AWDW (m),

Assault on
Female, Pointing
a Gun
1, 2, or 3

Simple Assault
Total
Misdemeanor

1__

8. Wright & Engen, supra note 1, at 1960 & n.105 ("The sum of cases contained in the
rows for different offense classes do not correspond exactly to the total number of felonies
and misdemeanors because we have removed a few final charges that include very small
numbers. The same observation holds true for subsequent tables in this Article.").
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As for kidnapping, Table 2 indicates that only 70% of the cases
originally charged as Class C kidnapping eventually moved to less
serious charges; only 59% of the Class E kidnappings moved to lesser
charges.
Table 2
Offense Class of Conviction by Class of Most Serious
Charged Offense: Kidnapping 9
Charged Offense
Class C
Class E
(N = 163)
(N = 101)

Total
(N = 264)

Conviction
Offense Class
Felony
C

Most Common
Offense

Kidnap 1

Kidnap 2

Kidnap 1 or 2, AWDS
IKSI

4_(03Wk.-)

0

49 (19%)

D

Robbery w/DW

22 (14%)

0

22 (8%)

E

Kidnap 2

28(17%)

41(41%)

69(26%)

F

Felonious Restraint

24 (15%)

23 (23%)

47 (18%)

Total Felony

141 (86%)

69 (68%)

210 (80%)

AWDW,
Assault on Female

13 (8%)

22 (22%)

35 (13%)

False Imprisonment

9 (6%)

10 (10%)

19 (7%)

Total Misdemeanor

22 (14%)

32 (32%)

54 (20%)

Misdemeanor
Al

1

We hypothesize that these differences among crimes result, in part,
from the structure of the criminal code. Where the criminal code offers
the attorneys a deeper set of plausible charges as landing spots in the
negotiations, more charge movement happens. Because the criminal
code offers so many different versions of assault, those charges move
down more often than charges for kidnapping, where the available
9. Wright & Engen, supra note 1, at 1964.
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statutory options are not so deep.
A group of crimes shows great depth if it offers a large number of
charges at different levels of sentencing. A group that is perfectly deep
might offer viable options at each offense class below the most serious
form of the crime. For instance, a group might present options at felony
Classes D, E, F, G, H, and I, along with misdemeanor Classes Al, 1, 2,
and 3.
B. The Felony-MisdemeanorLine
Just as the "depth" of negotiating options seems to influence the
amount of charge movement, the "distance" among options might do
the same. Two crimes might stand a great distance apart if the sentences
that flow from those crimes are spaced far apart. For instance, a crime
group might start with a Class C felony as the most serious available
charge (with a presumptive range of 58-73 months for Prior Record
Level I), while the next most serious crime appears all the way down at
Class G (with a presumptive range of 10-13 months). A shift from Class
C to Class D (51-64 months) would involve a lesser distance.
Although we have explored the distance concept less than the depth
concept so far,'0 we can hypothesize the effects of distance." Predictions
about the effects of distance on charge movement depend on whether
one takes the perspective of the defendant or the prosecutor. As the
distance increases between the current charge and a proposed lower
charge, the amount of the sentence reduction increases, so the incentive
for the defendant to plead guilty also probably increases. From this
perspective, one would predict that charge reductions will increase as
the distance (i.e., the size of the reduction) increases. Conversely, if we
surmise that district attorneys are less willing to reduce the top charge
when it requires a larger concession, then we would predict that as
distance increases, charge reductions should be less likely. 2
10. Our work so far leaves open some pivotal empirical questions about charge
movement. It may be possible to compare code features to other possible causes of charge
movement, such as defendant characteristics, structural features of a prosecutor's office, or a
defense attorney organization.
11. For our earlier discussion of distance in a criminal code, see Wright & Engen, supra
note 1, at 1940.
12. Based on consumer behavior in other negotiating contexts, it is also a plausible
hypothesis that the effects of distance between the available charges are contingent on the
absolute value of the punishment in question-higher absolute values require bigger
discounts to produce comparable plea rates. That is, a defendant facing a severe sentence
would insist on a greater concession before giving up a chance of acquittal. Negotiators in
other settings think about proposed discounts in proportional rather than absolute values.
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As we mentioned briefly in our earlier article, the movement from a
felony to a misdemeanor effectively increases the distance between the
two charges.13 Felony convictions carry longer term consequences than
misdemeanors, such as exposure to habitual felon sentences in future
cases, and quicker build-up of criminal history points."
Thus, a
reduction that results in conviction for a misdemeanor rather than a
felony should be especially attractive to defendants. At the same time,
prosecutors should be less willing to reduce felony charges if it would
require moving to a misdemeanor. Thus, it is difficult to predict when
felony charges are likely to be reduced to misdemeanor status.
However, research and experience suggest that (a) prosecutors
generally have the upper hand in negotiating guilty pleas and in setting
the terms of negotiation, and (b) defendants generally will be motivated
to accept any offer that reduces their sentence, even if it is not their
preferred option. Therefore, we predict that the increased distance, in
theory, should reduce the number of deals that cross the felonymisdemeanor dividing line. The parties would naturally think of lower
felony charges as less costly to the prosecution (and less valuable for the
defense) than any misdemeanor charge that is also on the negotiating
table. 5 Lower felony charges also provide value for the defendant and
thus facilitate compromise as the parties can agree to the "intermediate"
option (i.e., a lesser felony) if one is available.
It is also easy to imagine that depth and distance interact with each
other. We would expect that a set of crimes offering a larger number of
felony options with larger distances between them would produce fewer
misdemeanor outcomes because the code is structured to give the
negotiators many possible resting places before crossing the felonymisdemeanor divide.
1. A Measurement of Depth in Felony Charge Options
To test whether depth in the criminal code affects the likelihood of
felony charges being reduced to misdemeanors, we examine North
For instance, classic research into economic behavior confirms repeatedly that buyers value a
savings of $15 on a $100 item more than they value a savings of $15 on a $1,000 item.
13. Wright & Engen, supra note 1, at 1967.
14. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17 (2005); David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the
Penalty: The Role of ProsecutorialDiscretion Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L.

& ECON. 591, 603 (2005).
15. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007)
(detailing different negotiating postures of prosecution and defense in low-level cases versus
felonies).
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Carolina felony data. 16 We select cases in which the most serious
originating charge was a common crime of violence (non-sexual assaults,
kidnapping, and robbery) or a high-volume non-violent crime
(burglary/breaking and entering and sale, delivery, or possession of
cocaine). These offenses vary in the depth of charging options available
to prosecutors, and they represent a range of seriousness levels, from
Class H up to Class C.
Our previous analysis using these data from North Carolina
suggested that the rate of charge movement (i.e., reductions in the
seriousness of the primary charge) is a function of the depth and
distance within the criminal code. The empirical analysis, however, was
primarily illustrative. The present analysis goes a step further by
measuring the depth of the criminal code for each of these offenses in a
more precise fashion, and presenting a more rigorous empirical test of
our predictions.
To measure the depth of charging options for each originating
charge we look first to the criminal code to identify crimes that
constitute lesser included forms of each offense, and then examine the
actual distribution of conviction offenses to identify the less-serious
charges that prosecutors frequently used in these cases. We count an
offense as a readily available charging option if it meets the following
criteria: (1) it clearly constitutes a lesser included form of the originating
offense, or it accounts for 5% or more of all convictions of cases charged
with the originating offense; and (2) it has a lower offense class than the
originating charge. The total number of these less-serious charges that
we identify, plus the original charge, equals the total charging options or
"depth" for that crime. In all but one instance, the charging options we
identify based on the frequency of convictions are also the lesser
included charges from the criminal code. We describe the sample
offenses and the coding of depth in detail below. Tables 3 and 4 present
the distribution of conviction charges and the depth rating for each
originating charge in our sample.

16. Our data, provided by the North Carolina Sentencing Policy and Advisory
Commission, covers all felonies charged in the state of North Carolina for fiscal year 19992000. For further description of the data, see Wright & Engen, supra note 1, at 1961-67.
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Table 3
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Offense of Conviction by Most Serious
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Table 4
Offense of Conviction by Most Serious Charged Offense:

Selected Non-Violent Offenses 8

Conviction
Offense
Class

Most Common
Offenses

Charged Offense
Class D
Class G
(N = 440)
(N = 224)
Burglary 1
Burglary
2

Felony
D

Burglary 1

47
(11%)

E

Att. Burglary 1

21

Class G
(N = 1,272)
Sell/
Consp. to
Sell
Cocaine

Class H
(N = 4,649)
Break/
Enter

Class H
(N = 3,362)
PWI,
Deliver
Cocaine

(5%)
G

Burglary 2

90
(20%)

78
(35%)

Sell or Conspire
to Sell Cocaine
H

Break/Enter,
PSP, Larceny

851
(68%)
129
(29%)

82
(37%)

PWI or Deliver
Cocaine
I

Break/Enter
Veh.,
Possess
Cocaine, misc.
Total Felony

Felony Depth
Misdemeanor
Al
AWDW,
Assault-SI,
Assault on
Female
1, 2, or 3

Break/Enter
(m), Larceny
Paraphernalia,
Marijuana,
Simple assault,
weapon
Total
Misdemeanor

18. Id. at 1965-66.

3
(<1%)
81
(2%)
2,905
(62%)
298
(23%)

7
(2%)

1,789
(53%)
79
(2%)

4
(2%)
80
(6%)
1,232
(97%)
3

305
(69%)
4

164
(73%)
2

19
(4%)

3
(1%)

26
(<1%)

116
(26%)

57
(25%)

1,630
(35%)

2,993
(64%)
2

31
(2%)

135
(31%)

60
(27%)

31
(2%)

1,102
(33%)
2,979
(89%)
2

383
(11%)

1,656
(36%)

383
(11%)
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Assault. The felony assault crimes we examine include assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury (Class C),19
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill (Class E),2 ° assault with
a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury (also Class E),21 and assault
inflicting serious injury (Class F).22 No other felony charges accounted
for more than 4% of convictions in these cases. Thus the most serious
assault (Class C) has a depth of four charging options, while Class E
assaults have a depth of two, and Class F assault has a depth of one.
Robbery. The robbery charges we selected for analysis include
robbery with a deadly weapon (Class D),23 common law robbery (Class
G), 24 and attempted common law robbery (Class H).25 The North
Carolina Code includes two other felony crimes that may also be
supported in these cases: conspiracy to commit robbery with a deadly
weapon (Class E)26 and larceny from a person (Class H). 27 Based on
these designations in the code and the distribution of conviction charges,
robbery with a deadly weapon (Class D) has a depth of five felony
charging options, while common law robbery (Class G) and attempted
common law robbery (Class H) have depths of two and one felony
charging options respectively.
Kidnapping. Cases could originate with kidnapping in the first
degree (Class C) 28 or kidnapping in the second degree (Class E). 29 Facts
that support either of these originating charges would likely also support
a charge of felonious restraint (Class F). 30 Thus, there are relatively few
viable options for reducing kidnapping charges to lesser included
offenses. However, 14% of cases charged with Class C kidnapping were
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32(a) (2005). Other less-frequently charged assaults at Class C
include malicious castration, id. § 14-28, and malicious maiming, id. § 14-30.
20. Id. § 14-32(c).
21. Id. § 14-32(b). Other less common assaults at Class E include castration or maiming
without malice aforethought, id. § 14-29, malicious throwing of corrosive acid or alkali, id. §
14-30.1, malicious assaulting in a secret manner, id. § 14-31, or patient abuse and neglect, id. §
14-32.2(b)(2).

22. Id. § 14-32.4(a). Other less common options at Class F are an aggravated assault or
assault and battery on a handicapped person, id. § 14-32.1(e), or patient abuse, id. § 1432.2(b)(3).
23. See id. § 14-87.
24. Id. § 14-87.1.
25. See id. § 14-2.5.
26. See id. § 14-2.4.
27. Id. § 14-70.
28. Id. § 14-39(b).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 14-43.3.
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convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon (Class D). The latter is the
one instance where we count a charge as a readily available charging
option that is not also a lesser included offense. This may indicate that
kidnapping frequently occurs in the course of robbery. Although
robbery may better describe the motives and intent of the offender, the
criminal code and sentencing guidelines designate kidnapping as the
more serious offense. Thus, first degree kidnapping has a depth of four
viable options, while second degree kidnapping has a depth of two.
Burglary. We selected cases originating with three different
burglary-related crimes: burglary in the first degree (Class D),31 burglary
in the second degree (Class G),32 and breaking and entering a building
(Class H).33 The North Carolina Code also includes attempted firstdegree burglary (Class E), which provides an additional lesser included
option for the most serious burglary charges. 3' No other felony charges
accounted for more than 2% of convictions in these cases. Thus, first
degree burglary (Class D) has a depth of four charging options, while
second degree burglary (Class G) has a depth of two. Below breaking
and entering (Class H), the only lesser felony charges not requiring
proof of a specialized fact (such as breaking and entering a vehicle, a
Class I felony)35 are misdemeanors.3 6 Thus, we designate breaking and
entering a building as having only one felony charging option (that is, a
depth of one).
Sale/Possessionof Cocaine. Drug crimes pose additional difficulties
for this analysis because trafficking offenses are subject to mandatory
minimum sentences, they follow a separate punishment chart, and the
available data do not allow us to determine precisely the exact
originating offense (which turns on drug quantity).37 Therefore, we limit
the present analysis to offenses originating as one of two non-trafficking
crimes: sale or conspiracy to sell cocaine (Class G)3" and delivery or
possession with intent to deliver cocaine (Class H). 9 These charges
would also support a charge of simple possession of cocaine, a lesser
31. Id. § 14-52.
32. Id.
33. See id. § 14-54(a) (breaking or entering building with intent to commit felony or
larceny therein).
34. See id. § 14-2.5.

35. Id. § 14-56.
36. Id. § 14-54(b).

37. See id. § 90-95.
38. See id.
39. See id.
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included felony (Class 1). 40 Therefore, cases originating as sale or
conspiracy to sell cocaine have a depth of three felony charging options,
and cases charged with delivery or possession with intent have a depth
of two.
2. Results and Analysis: Effects of Code Depth on Misdemeanors
Previously we observed that charge reductions in North Carolina are
more frequent among more serious than less serious cases. We
suggested that this counter-intuitive finding (counter-intuitive if one
assumes that prosecutors would be less likely to show leniency in more
serious cases) could be explained by the depth of charging options
available.
That is, the more options available the more likely
prosecutors are to reduce charges. Here we test a corollary hypothesis:
the greater the depth of felony charging options, the less likely
prosecutors are to reduce felony charges to misdemeanors.
To test this prediction, we compare the percentage of cases resulting
in a felony conviction (as opposed to a misdemeanor) by the depth of
available charging options for all of the cases in our sample (N =
13,962). Results of this analysis appear in Table 5. Consistent with our
prediction, cases with more felony options result in felony convictions at
much higher rates than cases with fewer options.

40. See id. § 90-95(b)(2).
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Table 5
Felony Convictions (vs. Misdemeanor) by Depth of
Felony Charging Options
% Felony
Convictions

N

64%
76%
88%
88%
75%

4,795
5,328
1,934
1,905
13,962

Class C, D, E only
1
2
3
4
Total

n/a
42%
71%
88%
72%

0
5,328
1,934
1,905
3,636

Class F, G, H only
1
2
3
4
Total

64%
85%
98%
n/a
76%

4,795
4,299
1,232
0
10,326

Depth of Options
All Cases
1
2
3
4
Total

Among cases where the
The differences are quite striking.
originating charge has only one felony option, 64% are convicted of
felonies, with 36% being reduced to misdemeanors. As the depth of
options increases to two or three, the percentage of felony convictions
increases to 76% and 88%, respectively, a 12% increase with each
additional felony option. However, when the depth of options increases
to four, the percentage of felony convictions remains at a substantial
88%. Thus, while the percentage of felony convictions is maximized at a
depth of three, the pattern is clear and strong-the more felony options
available for an originating offense type, the higher the percentage of

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[91:9

those cases resulting in a felony conviction."
It is worth asking, however, whether the relationship between felony
options and felony convictions simply reflects an unmeasured effect of
offense seriousness.
That is, in general we would expect that
prosecutors in cases involving more serious felonies would have more
lower felonies to choose from. Prosecutors might also be less inclined to
reduce higher felonies than lower felonies down to misdemeanors,
simply because they are more serious. Thus, the association between
depth of options and conviction on a felony versus misdemeanor charge
could be spurious and due to the effects of offense class.
To explore this alternative explanation for the pattern, we perform
three additional tests. First, we divide our sample into two groups, cases
originating at Class C, D, or E versus cases originating at Class F, G, or
H; then we examine the percentage of felony convictions by depth
separately for these groups. The results, also presented in Table 5, are
unambiguous. For the less serious as well as the more serious felonies,
there is a clear and consistent increase in the percentage of cases
convicted of felony charges as the number of charging options increases.
In fact, the relationship is more consistent than when we examined all
cases together. For each group, the likelihood of a felony conviction
increases sharply with each increase in the number of felony options.42
As a second test, we examine the percentage of felony convictions by
the offense class of the originating charge, ignoring for the moment the
depth of charging options. These results, which appear in Table 6,
provide additional evidence that offense class cannot account for the
pattern we observe regarding depth. Although the percentage of cases
resulting in felony convictions clearly varies by the offense class of the
originating charge, the relationship is not linear, nor is it monotonic. In
fact, the most serious (Class C) and the least serious (Class H)
originating offenses in our sample are equally likely to result in felony
convictions (74% of each class). The cases most likely to result in felony
convictions are Class D (88%) and Class G (86%), which are the second
most serious and second least serious classes of offenses, respectively,
and the originating offenses with the smallest percentage of felony
41. A chi-square test indicates that the association between depth of options and felony
convictions is statistically significant (Chi-square = 664.5; df = 3; p < .001), meaning that the
probability of the pattern observed in our sample occurring by chance is less than one in one
thousand, or 0.1%.
42. Again, chi-square tests indicate that the association is highly statistically significant
for Class C-E charges (Chi-square = 898; df = 2; p < .001) and for Class F-H charges (Chisquare = 666; df = 2; p < .001).
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convictions are mid-level felonies at Class E (43%) and Class F (40%).
Finally, as we observed previously, the more serious originating charges
(Class C, D, and E) are slightly less likely to be convicted of felonies
than the less serious originating charges.43 Thus, there is no evidence
that charge movement from felony to misdemeanor is less likely among
more serious than less serious offenses.
Table 6
Percentage of Felony Charges Convicted as Felony
(vs. Misdemeanor) by Felony Offense Class
Offense Class
Charged
C
D
E
Subtotal C-E

% Felony
Convictions
74%
88%
43%
72%

N
838
1,742
1,056
3,636

F
G
H
Subtotal F-H

40%
86%
74%
76%

146
2,172
8,008
10,326

Total

75%

13,962

In our third test, we computed the partial correlation coefficient
measuring the association between depth of options and conviction on a
felony charge, controlling for the offense class of the originating charge.
The partial correlation (r = .338) is highly statistically significant
(p < .001), indicating a strong, positive, linear relationship between the
number of available felony charging options and the likelihood that a
case will result in a felony conviction that is independent of the
seriousness of the original felony charge.
In summary, it appears that crimes with deeper options for felony
outcomes encourage negotiators to resolve the case as a felony, even
when a misdemeanor is also an option, and even when the original
charge is not very serious. In these areas of greatest depth, the criminal
code is structured to make prosecutors especially reluctant to cross the

43. See Wright & Engen, supra note 1, at 1958.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[91:9

felony-misdemeanor line. The parties seem to treat misdemeanor
outcomes as the least favored option-if not a last resort-even though
such outcomes would be the most attractive for defendants, a likely
reflection of the prosecutor's domination of plea negotiations. These
findings are all the more striking given that our sample includes violent
crimes as well as drug and property crimes.
III. THEORIES OF PROSECUTION
The first phase of this project remained at the empirical level. In this
part, we start exploring both theoretical and normative implications:
Having documented some of the features of criminal codes that foster
more charge movement, should we favor criminal codes that make
charge movement easier? Would different theories of prosecution lead
one to different normative conclusions about charge movement and the
best structure for a criminal code?
One of the challenges for this enterprise arises from a gap in the
socio-legal literature. There is not a well-recognized set of selfconscious theories about prosecution in the legal and criminological
literature." We will, therefore, offer an organizational scheme for
understanding the various partial and implicit theories of prosecution.
For each of the major groups, we ask about the likely posture of the
theories towards charge movement.
In particular, theories of prosecutor decision making can be seen as
addressing two overarching questions. First, what is the prosecutor's
main objective, and what factors do prosecutors routinely consider when
selecting charges or when negotiating a plea agreement? Second, and
particularly salient in jurisdictions with more determinate and less
discretionary sentencing laws, who in fact controls charging and
sentencing decisions?
Theories of prosecution differ in another important respect, as well.
Some theories emphasize the work of individual line prosecutors, often
from microeconomic or sociological perspectives that emphasize the
subjective judgments of prosecutors. Other theoretical perspectives
view prosecutors and the decisions they make in the context of

44. As we will see, there are many theories to explain some aspects of the prosecutor's
work, such as plea negotiations, and there are many accounts of prosecution more generally
that rely on theories that are less than fully articulated. For other observations about the
incomplete and implicit nature of current theories of prosecution, see Bibas, supra note 2, at
2464-66; Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking by Prosecutors: The Uses of Discretion in
Regulating Plea Bargaining,73 JUDICATURE 335,335, 340 (1990).
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organizational settings, local court communities, and other criminal
justice agencies. These theories tend to emphasize the importance of
organizational needs and constraints, and the interaction among
prosecutors and other critical actors or institutions.
Although most theoretical approaches speak to both of these
questions and consider both the goals of individual prosecutors as well
as the broader context in which they work, the mix of objectives is
different for different theories.
A. "What": Theories of the Individual Prosecutor
1. Survey of the Theories
Our review of prosecutor theories starts with those accounts that
emphasize the individual work of line prosecutors, often concentrating
on what they hope to accomplish. A number of scholars adopt an
economic model of prosecutorial decision making that emphasizes crime
control-the efforts of a line prosecutor, both in selecting and disposing
of charges, to minimize crime. In different theoretical accounts,
prosecutors might choose slightly different means to this end. Perhaps
they attempt to accomplish crime control through maximizing the
amount of punishment (prison and other correctional resources) applied
to offenders.45 If so, then we would expect charge movement to be
largely unrelated to the seriousness of the initial charges or to depth and
distance in the criminal code. Or perhaps the individual prosecutor
creates a set of priorities among crimes (independent of punishments
that attach to those crimes under the code or in practice) and tries to
maximize the convictions for the highest priority crimes. 46 Most
theories, at least implicitly, assume that prosecutors prioritize more
serious crimes and crimes against persons (as opposed to property or
minor drug crimes), in which case one would expect more charge
movement among the less serious forms of offending. Finally, the
prosecutor might attempt to maximize the number of convictions,
without much regard to the punishment or the priority attached to each

45. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289, 290-91 (1983); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. &
ECON. 61, 98-99 (1971); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial
Discretion,78 AM. ECON. REV. 713 (1988).
46. See H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE 180, 197 (1996); Bibas, supra note 2,
at 2470; Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 958 (1997).
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conviction. In this case, one would expect frequent charge movement,
independent of crime seriousness. Charge movement should also be
related to the depth of charging options in the criminal code that
facilitate plea negotiation. The data we presented above most clearly
resemble the latter pattern of charge movement-frequent charge
movement at all levels of offense seriousness, with reductions from
felony to misdemeanor being significantly related to the depth of
charging options available.
Some sociological and criminological theories also point to crimecontrol concerns that drive decision making by court officials, including
prosecutors. In selecting the cases that call for the highest priority in the
crime control effort, however, these theories maintain that prosecutors
will consider more than the seriousness of the available provable
These theories claim that criminal justice actors (both
charges.
prosecutors and judges) make subjective judgments about offenders'
culpability and dangerousness, judgments that affect their charging and
sentencing decisions.48 According to these accounts, the seriousness of
the crime and the defendant's criminal history affect these subjective
judgments, but prosecutors also form impressions of offenders'
culpability and dangerousness based on non-charged conduct and other
clues, including stereotypes regarding race, ethnicity, gender, or age;
characteristics of the victim; or the victim's relationship to the
defendant. 49 Thus, these theories would predict that charge movement
will differ depending on the type and seriousness of the crime, but that
legally irrelevant social status characteristics, of both defendants and
victims, will also be important.
The theories of prosecution we have canvassed so far share the
implicit assumption that individual prosecutors pursue public goods,
such as the control of crime or fostering public safety.5 ° Other
47. Bowers, supra note 15; Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for
the Guilty, 49 J.L. & ECON. 353, 354 (2006).
48. Darrell Steffensmeier et al., Gender and Imprisonment Decisions, 31 CRIMINOLOGY

411, 411 (1993).
49. See Cassia Spohn et al., The Impact of the Ethnicity and Genderof Defendants on the
Decision to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 175, 175-76 (1987); see also
Celesta A. Albonetti, An Integration of Theories to Explain Judicial Discretion, 38 Soc.
PROBS. 247 (1991); Darrell Steffensmeier et al., The Interaction of Race, Gender, and Age in
Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment Cost of Being Young, Black, and Male, 36
CRIMINOLOGY 763, 763, 771 (1998).
50. Similarly, an account of the individual prosecutor's work concentrates on classic

purposes of the criminal law apart from crime control-that is, deterrence, incapacitation, or
rehabilitation. In particular, some theories postulate that retribution or proportionality is the
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theoretical accounts of prosecution, however, emphasize the individual
interests of the line prosecutor. Treating the prosecutor as the classic
self-interested rational actor of economic theory, these accounts suggest
that prosecutors exercise their discretion to charge and resolve cases in
ways that serve their personal and professional goals. For instance, the
line prosecutor might negotiate guilty pleas to increase the chances that
he or she will try especially interesting or difficult cases as a way to
showcase or perhaps improve trial skills.51 Or perhaps the prosecutor
will push to try notorious cases that can enhance the prosecutor's
reputation in the legal community.52
Other theories point to even more blatant forms of self-interest to
account for prosecutorial choices. A number of studies, for instance,
find that job performance for line prosecutors is often judged in terms of
conviction rates and one's ability to manage caseloads efficiently, more
than by the rate of one's success in criminal trials.53 Indeed, in some
offices a high trial rate might be seen as a sign of overzealousness or
ineffective negotiating skills. Thus career advancement within the DA's
office and in the local legal community may exert pressure on
prosecutors to appear efficient in their jobs by maintaining a high rate of
convictions and avoiding the embarrassment of losing at trial. Others
point out that prosecutors can increase their leisure time by resolving
more cases through guilty pleas rather than trials and by declining more
prosecutions.'

best organizing principle to explain the selection and disposition of charges. See Russell L.
Christopher, The Prosecutor'sDilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
93, 127-28 (2003). Interestingly, while it is easy to find the influence of "just deserts" theory
on substantive criminal law and on punishment, it is more difficult to identify a self-conscious
"just deserts" theory of prosecution.
51. See Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the
Federalizationof Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259,260-61 (2000).
52. See Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career
Objectives of FederalProsecutors,48 J.L. & ECON. 627, 649 (2005).
53. See ARTHUR ROSETT & DONALD R. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA
BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE 128-32 (1976). See generally ABRAHAM S.
BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 44-50 (1967); Celesta A. Albonetti, Criminality,
ProsecutorialScreening, and Uncertainty: Toward a Theory of Discretionary Decision Making
in Felony Case Processings,24 CRIMINOLOGY 623,626 (1986).
54. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, CriminalJustice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 43, 50-53 (1988); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargainingas Disaster,101 YALE
L.J. 1979, 1988 (1992); Nuno Garoupa & Frank H. Stephen, Law and Economics of PleaBargaining(July 2006), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=917922.
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2. Normative Implications '
What are the implications for charge movement under these various
theoretical portrayals of the individual prosecutor's objectives? We
suggest that the two groupings suggested above-theories that
emphasize public-regarding objectives versus theories that concentrate
on self-regarding objectives of the prosecutor-produce different
attitudes toward charge movement.
Under the public-regarding accounts of the prosecutor's work,
particularly the economic model of decision making, more negotiating
options may be seen as desirable for the purpose of crime-control.
Additional charging options allow the prosecutor to make incremental
pricing adjustments to purchase the most convictions (or the most
sentencing impact, or the most priority convictions, or the most public
satisfaction) with a fixed budget. Given that prosecutors are more
familiar with the details of the vast majority of cases than judges are,
and assuming that the evidence presented by law enforcement is
accurate, prosecutors may be in a better position than judges to
determine an appropriate charge and to produce an appropriate
punishment. If one is willing to grant prosecutors considerable control
over the sentencing process, more negotiating power can facilitate this
goal.
However, this also requires placing great faith in the ability and
judgment of line prosecutors.
If prosecutors' charging and plea
negotiations are biased, reflecting stereotypes based on the either the
victims' or the defendants' race, ethnicity, sex, or age, as some research
contends, then the pursuit of one public good-crime control-may
come at the expense of another-equality under the law. Furthermore,
the prospect of wrongful convictions-a profound tragedy of justice that
DNA testing has revealed to be more common than most previously
imagined-and the evidence that prosecutor error or misconduct often
is to blame, should give us pause when considering whether to increase
prosecutors' leverage. Due process and justice may suffer.
For the theories that stress self-regarding behavior by prosecutors,
charge movement is clearly unappealing because it would likely be used
to further private goods. In this setting, it would be more desirable to
keep tighter controls over the agents of the people who do not strictly
serve their principals' interests. Less depth in the criminal code would
lead to less charge movement, and would make it easier to monitor line
prosecutors and to specify the resolutions that are acceptable for a given
category of cases.
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B. "Who": Theories of the Prosecutorin Context
A second set of theories views the prosecutor as an actor embedded
in a complex organizational and institutional context, where individual
interests, organizational imperatives, and external pressures converge to
affect prosecutorial choices. These theories assert that prosecutors seek
objectives other than crime control, and they point to multiple parties
that influence the work of the prosecutors.
For example, the
prosecutor's office must perform its work in concert with judges and
defense attorneys, and in light of feedback from the community, and
must live within the resource limits and other boundaries created by
legislative bodies, the state attorney general, and law enforcement
agencies. Thus, in addition to addressing the motives and objectives of
individual prosecutors, these theories of prosecution implicitly ask a
second question, "Who decides on criminal prosecutions?"
One of the most obvious and under-explored organizational
influences on the work of a prosecutor is the direction that comes from
within the prosecutor's office. The chief prosecutor sets priorities for
the line prosecutors and creates an environment in which the middle
management of the office interpret and enforce (or fail to enforce) the
chief's stated priorities.5 The tools that operate here include formal,
articulated policies, but more informal transmission of "office culture"
also happens as a matter of course, and changes the choices that
individual line prosecutors would make if left entirely to their own
judgment.
From an organizational perspective, a number of sociological studies
describe the charging and plea process as essentially an administrative
process driven by efficiency concerns which, for prosecutors, means a
high conviction rate and few trials. 6 In this view, the organizational
imperatives of the office explain prosecutorial choices better than any
emphasis on crime control or individual benefit for a prosecutor. 7 Such
theories suggest that outcomes may be driven by considerations other
than what might be most appropriate or deserved in a particular case.
55. See, e.g., Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55
STAN. L. REv. 29, 49 (2002).
56. See ROSETr & CRESSEY, supra note 53, at 128. See generally David Sudnow,
Normal Crimes: Sociological Featuresof the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office, 12 SOC.

PROBS. 255 (1965).
57. BLUMBERG, supra note 53, at 50; Jo Dixon, The OrganizationalContext of Criminal
Sentencing, 100 AM. J. SoC. 1157, 1162-63 (1995); Rodney L. Engen & Sara Steen, The Power
to Punish: Discretion and Sentencing Reform in the War on Drugs, 105 AM. J. SoC. 1357, 1363
(2000).
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For instance, some cases that might be won are rejected, and others may
be reduced to a charge less than what could, in fact, be proven in trial,
simply because the office routines allocate more resources to other types
of cases.
These theories also look beyond the confines of the prosecutor's
office and characterize the prosecution of crime as the product of
interactions among several government institutions. Prosecution, they
contend, is best described and understood by looking to the interaction
between prosecutors and police departments,58 or between prosecutors
and defense attorney organizations, or between prosecutors and courts.
Within the local court environment, some theories emphasize that the
prosecutor forms part of a "working group" in the courthouse, a group
that also includes defense attorneys, court clerks, and judges. From this
perspective, the prosecutor's objective is to foster stable-and even
friendly-relationships with the other members of the working group.
The prosecutor, therefore, would generally not depart from the normal
expectations for the charging and processing of cases, norms that the
group develops to assure acceptable working conditions and a proper
flow of cases in a busy system.5 9
Some social scientists have described this process, and the
interaction among prosecutors and other government institutions, in
terms of "inter-organizational exchange" whereby each agency
accommodates the needs of the others. 60 In some specialized settings,
the interaction between the prosecutors and other governmental
institutions results in formal guidelines for prosecutors to follow. 6 More
commonly, the other agencies hold some control over the budget that
the prosecutor can spend, or the quality of the evidence in the case file,
or the severity of the sentence actually imposed. Another described
these relationships in terms of the degree of "coupling," or the degree to
which agencies are coordinated, and the degree to which decisions at
one stage influence outcomes at the next. 6 For example, in a more
58. See, e.g., Felice F. Guerrieri, Law & Order: Redefining the Relationship Between
Prosecutorsand Police, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 353, 353 (2001); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and
Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors,103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003).
59. See Peter F. Nardulli et al., Criminal Courts and BureaucraticJustice: Concessions
and Consensus in the Guilty Plea Process, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1103, 1109-10
(1985).
60. See George F. Cole, The Decision to Prosecute, 4 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 331, 332
(1970).
61. See Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateursof ProsecutorialSelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010 (2005).
62. See John Hagan et al., Ceremonial Justice: Crime and Punishment in a Loosely
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"tightly coupled" system, police and prosecutors may work closely
together, resulting in the actions of police having more relevance to the
final outcome. Legal structures can be seen as affecting the degree of
coupling too, by tying case outcomes to earlier decisions in charging and
plea bargaining.
Moving beyond the relationship between the prosecutor's office and
other agencies of government, some accounts of the prosecutor's power
highlight the interaction between the prosecutor and the community. In
particular, recent piecemeal developments in the world of prosecution
could be understood as a coherent movement toward "community
prosecution." Taking its cues from the more well-established model of
community policing,63 the community prosecution office looks beyond
the number or type of convictions obtained and takes a more victimand community-centered perspective on the work.
Under the rubric of "community prosecution," the prosecutor relies
on the community-through surveys, meetings, and other means-to set
priorities for prosecution, even if the priorities of the neighborhood do
not correspond to the most serious violations of the criminal code. The
community prosecutor considers crime prevention to be an essential part
of the job, not just crime punishment.' The reduction of crime itself
becomes secondary, one means to obtain a greater end: the community's
sense of safety and well-being. 6 Community prosecution also re-orients
the relationships between the prosecutor and other government
agencies. In a community prosecution model, the prosecutor does more
than manage the criminal charges and the flow of convictions. The chief
prosecutor must take a leadership role in coordinating the resources of
police departments, social service agencies, and any other groups that
can contribute to a healthier community, better able to ward off crime.
Thus, community prosecution represents both a "what" theory of
prosecution as well as a "who" theory; community perceptions of safety
and public order become the ultimate objective of prosecution (clearly
public goods); and the public itself becomes one of the relevant actors in
Coupled System, 58 Soc. FORCES 506, 508-10 (1979).

63. For an overview of community policing, see Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=36 (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
64. See Walter J. Dickey & Peggy A. McGarry, The Search for Justice and Safety
Through Community Engagement: Community Justice and Community Prosecution, 42
IDAHO L. REV. 313, 317, 363 (2006).

65. In another interesting variation on this theme, the individual prosecutor might aim
to maximize the amount of acceptance among defendants through an emphasis on procedural
justice. See Michael O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From Consultation to Guidelines,
91 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 329-32 (2007).
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prosecution choices.66
What do these "who" theories of prosecution tell us about charge
movement? Perhaps the answer to this question depends on choosing
sides. If the important effects of legal rules are their power to shift
control over prosecution choices from one actor to another, then one
might favor those legal rules that empower the most desirable actor in a
given setting. From this vantage point, a critical question is how depth
and distance in a criminal code affect the relative power of the
sentencing judge and prosecuting attorney. Generally speaking, easier
charge movement empowers the lowest levels of the prosecutor's office
as opposed to the chief prosecutor and management. As between the
prosecutor's office and other government agencies, deeper criminal
codes and greater charge movement empower the prosecutor.
But there is another consideration that runs through all of these
power struggles among institutions and individuals.
Whatever
institutions affect the outcomes of prosecutorial choices, it is crucial for
democratic legitimacy that the public be able to identify the responsible
parties. Transparency in the application of criminal law is a key virtue.67
Only when the public knows who is responsible for prosecutor outcomes
can voters change leadership to revise policies or spending priorities.
Charge movement, however, is likely to interfere with the community's
ability to follow the work of their agents. 6 It sends conflicting signals
about the estimated worth of the case and makes it more difficult to
compare one case to another.
Overall, then, we believe that "who" theories of prosecutors-those
that emphasize the organizational, community, and institutional forces
affecting prosecutors' choices-will lead more often to a negative
evaluation of charge movement and a preference for less depth in
criminal codes. Among the "what" theories of prosecution-those that
emphasize the individual prosecutors' objectives-the responses to
charge movement are less certain. These theories suggest that charge
66. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, GrassrootsPlea Bargaining,91 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 87 (2007);
Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution,40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1128-29 (2005).
67. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 917 (2006); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial
Neutrality, 2004 WIs. L. REV. 837, 902-03; Frank J. Remington, The Decision to Charge, the
Decision to Convict on a Plea of Guilty, and the Impact of Sentence Structure on Prosecution
Practices, in DISCRETION
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
THE
TENSION BETWEEN
INDIVIDUALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY 73, 78-79 (Lloyd E. Ohlin & Frank J. Remington
eds., 1993).
68. Cf. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1410 (2003).
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movement is a powerful tool that could be used well or abused. The
desirability of a deep criminal code will depend on what one concludes
to be the leading objective of prosecution and about how prosecutors
will pursue that objective. When the objective appears to be a public
good, deeper criminal codes and greater capacity for charge movement
will seem to be a reasonable way to enhance the prosecutor's work.
When prosecutorial decisions lead to inequality in the application of the
law, however, justice and the perceived legitimacy of the criminal courts
may be compromised.
C. Theoretical Implications
Our current and previous findings taken together throw some light
on public safety and just deserts models of prosecution. Seriousness of
the crime does not determine the rate at which felony charges are
reduced in the way that we would expect under those theories. Charge
reductions, including reductions from felony to misdemeanor, are
frequent among all groups of offenses and at all levels of seriousness,
and tend to be more frequent among higher level crimes. Even this
counter-intuitive relationship between offense seriousness and charge
reductions, however, is weak. Rather, we find that the availability of
lower felony charging options increases the rate of charge reductions
overall. It appears to us that having more options available probably
facilitates plea negotiations, making it more likely that the parties will
reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. This interpretation suggests
that efficiency in case resolution looms large among the factors driving
the process.
Likewise, our analysis in Part II finds that the reduction of felony
charges to misdemeanors is also driven by the availability of felony
options, and not by the seriousness of the originating charge. This
reveals another way that the criminal code structures charge movement:
the greater the depth of felony options, the less likely prosecutors are to
reduce the primary charge to a misdemeanor. This suggests that
prosecutors generally prefer not to reduce felonies to misdemeanors; if
they have felony options, they generally choose them. However, it is
also interesting to consider that when few felony options are available
we do not see a higher percentage of cases resulting in convictions of the
original charge. Rather, we see an increase in misdemeanor convictions.
Thus, while prosecutors may prefer felony convictions, they also seem to
prefer to gain a misdemeanor conviction than to invest the substantial
resources that would be required to try the case on the most serious
charge, and risk losing.
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IV. CONCLUSION
We hope the rubric of "charge movement" allows us to see
something meaningful about the work of prosecutors on both the
empirical and theoretical levels. On the empirical level, this project to
describe more precisely the exact location and amount of charge
movement-not resting content with the general observation that
charge bargaining is commonplace-can reveal the effects of criminal
code structure. Our analysis in this Essay, for instance, points out one
particular feature of the felony-misdemeanor dividing line. The parties
treat misdemeanor outcomes as a last resort, and deeper felony options
predictably lead to fewer misdemeanor outcomes.
On the theoretical level, our findings about charge movement offer
some insights on the explanatory power of different theories of the
prosecutor's work. Stronger theoretical accounts, in turn, clarify our
normative choices about the legal tools we make available to
prosecutors. Any coherent explanation and evaluation of a legal tool
such as charge movement will reveal a great deal about the users of that
tool.

